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Abstract 
In this paper we explore the implications of the epistemological position taken by 
writers of business history through a critical hermeneutic reading of recent key 
statements within this field. Using the theoretical lens provided by Ricoeur in 
Memory, History, Forgetting, we concentrate on the potentially reflexive nature of the 
historiographical operation that is involved in transforming memory into history. We 
argue that there is little sign of reflexive historiography within business history and 
suggest that this reluctance goes some way towards explaining the sub-discipline‟s 
relative isolation from the rest of organization and management studies.  
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Introduction 
Paul Ricoeur‟s name is mentioned frequently by historians working in business 
schools, sometimes his work is cited or quoted, yet historical analysis that mobilizes 
his ideas in depth and detail is rare. A simple empirical illustration helps support this 
claim. An August 2007 citation search on the Web of Knowledge database returned 
20 references to Ricoeur‟s last substantial work, Memory, History, Forgetting. A few 
of these citations are in management and organization studies journals but none are in 
specialist business history journals. A similar search for the French edition of the 
book published in 2000 returns 27 citations, none in any management and 
organization studies journal. The absence of this key contribution to understanding the 
historiographical operation in accounts of business history is all the more surprising 
when we notice the enthusiasm with which Ricoeur‟s work on narrative and time has 
been taken up within organization studies (see Sonsino 2005, for a review). 
 
This paper is an attempt to understand the neglect of this book in particular and the 
ideas it expresses in general. We present an extended reading of Memory, History, 
Forgetting (Ricoeur 2004, hereafter MHF), and interpret the arguments we find in it 
in the light of six recent statements of what business history is and should be. Our 
analysis takes business history to be the historical analysis of management, 
organizations, industries, and commerce. Based on our interpretation of the arguments 
Ricoeur presents, we suggest that there is a dominant but hidden epistemological (and 
therefore theoretical) position which underpins the conduct of business history as 
presented in our sample. From this we argue that closer examination of this 
foundational aspect of the historiographical operation might help to illuminate the 
field to other members of the management research community, an aim that business 
historians currently claim to pursue.  
 
Our source for this analysis is four review papers from what is generally 
acknowledged to be the premier journal in the field, Business History, published in 
1992, 2001, 2003 and 2007. In these papers, invited authors provide a summary and 
analysis of work from two years previously. We bracket these papers with two 
editorial policy statements published in the same journal in 1990 and 2007, which set 
an editorial agenda and aim to give „state of the nation‟ account of the conduct of 
business history. Based on these materials and our own engagement with business 
history (through primary research and analysis, conference presentations and 
publication) we want to raise the following possibility for debate. Business history as 
currently constituted, primarily through presentation of work and journal publication, 
at best neglects and at worst ignores the epistemological positions that are inherent to 
historical research and writing. We suggest that failing to take account of, or 
acknowledge beyond passing mention, theoretical developments in humanities and 
social sciences, which provide the doing of history and those self-defining as 
historians with a disciplinary context, contributes to the continuing marginalization of 
historical research and writing from the main currents of organization studies. 
Through this we also consider the argument that it is potentially dangerous to write 
about the doing of history: 
Why should historians write about the nature of history (rather than just do it)? 
The reasons are no doubt various. It may be an intellectual conversion from 
one perspective to another. It might be a desire to express epistemological 
certainty prompted by annoyance at those who are lapsing. Equally, it could be 
epistemological scepticism prompted by annoyance at those who are not 
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lapsing. It may be the nature of their professional training. It could be a 
rejection of their training prompted by concerns over the nature of the 
relationship between reference, explanation, meaning, truth and narrative. But 
whatever the reason it is always a risky business.  
(Munslow 2007, 613) 
Munslow goes on to argue that part of the risk in challenging the empirical-analytical 
approach that continues to dominate the discipline is the danger of undermining the 
credibility of historical narratives. Our contention, which we think Munslow would be 
sympathetic to, is that the „safety‟ of „theorizing in a [theoretical or epistemological] 
vacuum‟ (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2000, 287) is a false security that makes historical 
accounts of management and organization easier to dismiss or marginalise.  
 
This is important because, as in other sub-fields of organization studies such as small 
business research, our experience is that business historians are prone to bemoaning 
the marginality of their work. We suggest that the solution or resolution to this 
problem lies in part in the hands of those doing historical research. This would 
involve considerable re-orientation at an individual and collective level. We present 
our arguments and suggestions in the spirit of a gentle apologia, defending our 
position and „giving reasons, with room for doubt, directed to nonbelievers‟ 
(McCloskey 2006, 1) to those suspicious of the utility of epistemological inquiry or 
reflection in the historiographical operation.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. First, we set out our reading of the arguments that 
Ricoeur presents. Second, we interpret the key aspects of this redefinition of the 
historiographical operation and its implications for representing organizational pasts. 
Through our reading of the six papers published in Business History we then provide 
an account of the progression of business history. Finally we look at recent changes to 
the conduct of historical research and writing and explore the potential implications of 
these in light of our argument.  
 
Lest we remember: The presence of memory, testifying history and the possibility of 
forgetting 
 
It is important to note here that the book under discussion here forms part of a body of 
work that Paul Ricoeur built over the course of more than fifty years. From the base 
discipline of philosophy Ricoeur‟s work explored theology, ethics, and the possibility 
of understanding the self. The majority of his writings are directed towards 
developing a „philosophical anthropology‟ that enables understanding of the 
capabilities and weaknesses we all have or display as we make our way through the 
world. Many commentators note the methodological „shift‟ that Ricoeur made during 
his career from existential phenomenology to a more hermeneutic approach supported 
by phenomenological description. Alongside temporality, discourse, agency, 
narrative, identity, ethics, and politics, memory and history are generally accepted to 
be key themes in Ricoeur‟s work. He takes this action and dynamic as fundamental to 
our ability to constitute ourselves as people, to understand our actions as we engage 
with the world around us and as the subject of his last book. It would be beyond the 
scope of this paper to engage with the entire course of Ricoeur‟s work. Our purpose 
instead is to interpret what is generally understood to be a summative text in the light 
of recent developments and stated ambitions within business history. To this end we 
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take for granted the foundations of the book in Ricoeur‟s previous work and the 
philosophical traditions he worked within.  
 
From the title on, MHF is a book of triads. Introducing the text the author explains 
that its genesis lies in private, professional and public preoccupations. Privately, 
coming knowingly to the end of a long life, he was concerned with what happens to 
individuals‟ memory and the process of forgetting, both of which he defines as the 
median levels between temporal experience and the narrative operations involved in 
constructing self. Professionally, memory and forgetting are (or ought to be) key 
problematics for historians, a community Ricoeur counted himself as part of. Finally, 
there is a public concern, a civic duty to explore memory and forgetting as some 
events are unjustly forgotten while others are unduly celebrated. The book is 
structured into three parts: Part I is devoted to memory and related phenomena, 
underpinned by Husserlian phenomenology; Part II is dedicated to history, and in 
particular epistemologies of the historical sciences; last, Part III is presented as a 
meditation on forgetting, to enable a hermeneutics of the historical condition of being 
human. Each Part then unfolds in turn through three sections of its own: 
1. the phenomenology of memory: the object of memory (memory as it is given), 
the search for particular objects (recollection, or the exercise of memory), 
reflective memory, memory of oneself; 
2. epistemologies of history: witnessing and archives, the use of „because‟ in 
figures of explanation and understanding, historians‟ representation of the 
past; 
3. a hermeneutics of the historical condition: critical hermeneutics of history, 
„attentive to the limits of historical knowledge that a certain hubris of 
historical science transgresses again and again‟ (MHF, xvi), ontological 
hermeneutics to explore modalities of temporalization, and „the empire of 
forgetting‟. 
Despite the complexity of this structure and the issues addressed, and the density of 
Ricoeur‟s writing, the argument is made coherent by a common problematic – 
metaphorically, the ship that Ricoeur‟s three sails are masted in is „representation of 
the past‟. This overarching definition of the main theme of the book draws directly on 
the Platonic notion of the eikōn, translated as image/icon/likeness and defined as the 
„presence of an absent thing stamped with the seal of the anterior‟ (MHF, xvi). This 
leads directly to the claim that memory sits within imagination, an argument that 
forms the basis of our interpretation of the ideas this book contains and our contention 
that they have implications for the conduct of business history.  
 
Part I „On memory and recollection‟ is taken up with two questions: what are 
memories and who do they belong to? This is an attempt to draw out the nature of 
mnemonic phenomena as they are often our only resource in referring to the past and 
trying to be faithful to it. The topic is set up as important because it is an attempt to 
distinguish between remembering and imagining, to examine the truth claims made by 
and for memory. In the Platonic beginnings of philosophical inquiry into memory, 
truth and falsehood are accorded equivalent ontological and epistemological status, 
implying that they are versions of the same thing. Within this is the question of 
whether history is mimetic or imaginary. Throughout we are reminded of the status of 
„memory as the womb of history, inasmuch as memory remains the guardian of the 
entire problem of the representative relation of the present to the past‟ (MHF, 87). It is 
a very positive approach to understanding memory, both received and sought, arguing 
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that the dysfunctions of memory should not be treated as pathological but rather as a 
„shadowy underside of the bright region of memory‟ (MHF, 21). Attempting to 
remember has a truthful ambition and should not be criticized for that as we have 
nothing better. The end-point of this section is the observation that a commitment to 
critical agency is needed to critique what are defined as false testimonies and oppose 
them with more reliable accounts.  
 
This argument involves the recognition that history is inevitably bound up with 
understandings of time, founded on Aristotle‟s observation „but memory is of the 
past‟, which is contrasted with the sensation of the present and the conjecture of the 
future. Ricoeur aims to present a potential solution to the problem of the truth or 
falsity of memory (and hence the issues of mimesis and imagination) by separating 
our initial impressions and then their „others‟, or representations and impressions, 
achieved through the act of recollection. Crucially, this section of the book produces a 
perspective on the process of recalling individual events from the past and those 
recollections as mirrors of reality and nature that are dynamic, addressing the „effort 
to recall‟. Thus a distinction is made between spontaneous, relaxed „simple evocation‟ 
and laborious, tense „effort to recall‟, between the simple passive presence of 
memories and the effortful agentic act of recollection; this brings the possibility of 
error or illusion in the act of remembering to the fore.  
 
This basis then allows Ricoeur to construct a positive phenomenology of memory. 
The key argument stems from a reading of Husserl‟s work which suggests that 
reproduction is an act of imagination. This involves the reader in a „double imbroglio‟ 
(MHF, 50): memories return to us as images that are then presented in a form that 
seeks to be real (i.e. non-imagined, non-imaginative). This raises what Ricoeur calls 
the „background question‟ of trust that exploration of memory brings to the study of 
history, in the sense that we are all implicated as agents in the search for historical 
truth, inasmuch as we bring either „faithfulness‟ or the desire to be true to something. 
The need of those remembering and their historians to be true to something takes us 
into the uses and abuses of exercising memory – the pragmatics and practicality of 
memory as an action, power or capacity – in other words, how and why we „do‟ 
remembering. This makes way for another theme: how does the exercise of memory 
affect the ambition to truth? The possibility of bad mimetics or abuse of memory and 
history implies that both are vulnerable because of the absence of the object and its 
necessary representation. Drawing at various points on works by Freud, Weber, Marx, 
and Nietzsche, three levels of abuse are outlined, in order of the degree of control 
sought over the process:  
1. pathological therapeutic - blocked memory (Freud); 
2. practical - manipulated memory (Weber, Marx); 
3. ethico-political – memory abusively summoned, forced memory 
(commemoration-rememoration). 
Justice to the other, paying our debt to those gone as well as inventorying their 
heritage and giving moral priority to the victim of history are suggested as humanistic 
responses to the question of the „duty of memory‟.  
 
Memory is argued to be first individual and then collective, an important shift in the 
process of the historiographical operation. As Ricoeur notes, many argue for the 
private, individual character of memory, in which memory consciousness is tied to the 
past and is integral to personal identity. Yet there are possibilities of collective 
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memory and an intermediate level of reference where exchanges are made between 
living individual memory and public memory.  
 
Part II, „History, epistemology‟, addresses the „self-sufficiency of history‟s own self-
awareness‟ (MHF, 135); that is, the isolation of history from other social sciences and 
the observation that the philosophical project that informs history is tacit. For Ricoeur 
this separation and tacit philosophical positioning should not be countenanced. He 
suggests that the historical operation is seen as tripartite, with three methodological 
moments interwoven (that is, not necessarily chronologically successive):  
1. documentary: the establishment of documentary proof through statements or 
archives;  
2. explanation/understanding: the stage in which „because‟ is mobilized to 
answer „why‟, and hence the major epistemological moment;  
3. representation: putting the history into literary or written form.  
Each stage is explored in detail. The documentary phase is approached through the 
notion of inscription and the key moments in the transformation from oral to archival 
through „memorization‟: from memory to testimony (bearing witness), and from 
testimony given to testimony received (the construction of the archive by the 
historian). Testimony is thus defined as the process of making memory documentary 
and the trustworthiness we assign to the statements or archives generated in this 
process. Should the testimony be certified and accredited? If it is then the process of 
making an archive begins. A physical, spatial and social space is made for testimony, 
that „qualified personnel‟ might use; it will have an intent to preserve, organized 
material, and allow consultation. According to Ricoeur, archives must always be 
interrogated to establish how the observation happened in order to enable the 
testimony and the nature of the testimonial artifact (voluntary, involuntary, written, 
material) to be critiqued and to encourage corroboration and problematisation. 
 
Archives are more than this, however. The nature of archives, as the empirical basis 
that historians tend to work from, occupies a substantial part of the discussion in 
MHF, centrally in this part and as a secondary theme in the others. There are two 
main facets to this exploration: the status of documents in an archive, and the relation 
between testimony and document. The relation between memory and the contents of 
the archive is a significant epistemological move made by historians, from „raw‟ data 
to „scientific‟ data. Ricoeur notes that testimony enters a „critical zone‟, being 
confronted with other, perhaps conflicting, testimonies and a mass of other archival 
documents. This shift from being private to public is also noted in Derrida‟s (1998) 
examination of the contemporary archive. Thus memory passes from being personal 
to being a public claim about the past when it contributes to an archive. Memory is 
externalized in testimony, inscribed, preserved and sometimes consulted by historians.  
 
Ricoeur also presents a strong argument that the archive is socially constructed 
through the historiographical operation. The status of testimony comes into question, 
working from the basis that there are many psychological and social barriers to 
accuracy or truth in testimonies and the possibility of documentary proof. Proof, the 
argument runs, is dependent on the questions that a historian brings to an archive: „the 
documents do not speak unless someone asks them to verify, that is, to make true, 
some hypothesis‟ (MHF, 177). Facts, documents, and questions are therefore 
interdependent. The question, along with the trace and the document, constructs the 
historical object and historical knowledge. Within this facts have a referential status 
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as the „what‟ of historical discourse, distinct from how the referent happened. 
Notably, facts are not events.  
 
The central operation in the process detailed in Part II is the construction of 
explanation and understanding in historical writing. This is where the epistemological 
autonomy of history in relation to memory is most visible, as it is where we see the 
connector „because‟ being used. Throughout this section Ricoeur examines the 
construction of human reality as a social fact and history‟s place within the social 
sciences. The argument reviews 20th century French schools of historical thought, 
particularly the crisis of thought that the Annales school generated and the „new 
rigorous‟ approach to history that Foucault, de Certeau, and Elias exemplify. The 
reader is taken into the area of representation, the process through which social agents 
represent a historical object and the subsequent process through which historians 
produce a representation of the agentic representation of the historical object. The key 
problematic here is the role of writing in explanation and understanding. This then is 
the third part of the historiographical operation, the „scriptural representation‟ (in de 
Certeau‟s words) of making the historical text. Ricoeur is here at pains to emphasize 
that interpretation is not limited to this stage, as it stretches across all stages of 
historiography. Narrative forms of representation and the relation of historical 
discourse to fiction are explored, as are the resources mobilized and the 
representational capacities of history. This section engages very closely with the truth 
claims that history makes, in for example examining how narrative coherence may be 
distinguished from causal or teleological connections drawn in explanation/ 
understanding through the notion of emplotment (defined as co-ordination between 
events, causes, intentions, accidents, and narration into a single meaningful unity). 
Despite the close relations of history and fiction, however, a clear distinction remains 
for Ricoeur because of the external referent that historians work with, the extratextual 
reality that history claims to relate to.  
 
Part II ends with consideration of representation and rhetoric, a key theme for some 
scholars writing history since the linguistic turn in the social sciences and humanities. 
This is an area that for Ricoeur has the potential to turn history away from the past, 
from the real referent. Here we engage with what are characterized as attacks on 
history, in which for example its practice is closely compared to the 19
th
 century novel 
through ideas such as the „referential illusion‟. Ideas such as this led some to argue 
that historical writing does not refer to the real but only the intelligible and that 
superfluous details are used to disguise the narrative structure and intent of historical 
writing. Ricoeur challenges this thread of critique through the observation that 
historical writing must pass through documents, causal/teleological explanation and 
literary emplotment, but that none of these aspects make it fictional. Analyses that 
suggest history is „mere fiction‟, he argues, are theories of style or imagination, 
refined taxonomies, and not a useful alternative to the naïve realism of some historical 
writing. Ricoeur is clear in not being opposed to the role of narrativity in constructing 
meaning and accepts that narrative cannot be seen as „a neutral, transparent garment 
thrown over a signification complete in its meaning‟ (MHF, 276). However he argues 
that we must remember the equality of status that explanation and documents share in 
seeking to accredit the truth of historical discourse, and always return to the testimony 
of the witness that provides correspondence between representation and event. In the 
end, referring to the past must involve both a claim to reality and a statement about 
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how we experience the world – hence, it is both epistemological and ontological. This 
brings us to the third and final part of the book. 
 
Part III examines the „historical condition‟, and presents a „speculative philosophy of 
history‟. It is both critical and ontological, with the task of imposing limits on 
totalizing claims to knowledge. The text is mainly concerned with the notion of 
forgetting, defined as both an enemy of memory and a reserve that it can draw on. 
Ricoeur takes forgiveness as his ultimate end-point, fulfilling his initial aim of 
developing a critical hermeneutic of the historiographical operation 
 
The first section begins with moves towards a critical philosophy of history, through a 
metahistorical conception of the historiographical operation that allows exploration of 
the claims history makes to self-knowledge and legitimacy through objectivity. 
Importantly for our argument, the initial chapter in Part III takes up the issue of 
whether history can be self-sufficient, total in and of itself. Through the work of a 
further wide variety of contributors to understanding history (Nietzsche, Koselleck, 
Nagel, Ginzburg, and others), Ricoeur argues that the notion of history is a „collective 
singular‟, seen more clearly in German where we find the signifiers Geschichte 
(complex of events) and Historie (knowledge, narrative, historical science). Yet 
history as a collective singular is challenged by the argument that human plurality is 
hopelessly various and cosmopolitan, resulting in the high degree of specialization by 
professional historians that disallows global history. From this, the narrative moves on 
to examine the idea of a „single historical moment‟ in which a historical present is 
established by some historians as a unique observation point. This links to attempts by 
both judges and historians to occupy a space that allows for impartiality, a possibility 
that is undermined by the emplacement of both history and the judicial process (we 
are encouraged here to think of differing interpretations of the Salem witch-trials and 
the trials of contemporary terrorists). These considerations bring the reader back once 
more to White‟s (1987) critique of the rhetorical nature of history to conclude that the 
judicial process must ultimately judge the plausibility of narrative accounts of 
historical events, something that Ricoeur suggests White‟s framework does not allow 
for.  
 
This entire section is also underpinned by the conjoined notions of interpretation and 
self. Ricoeur argues for second order reflection on the historiographical process, 
emphasizing the impossibility of totally reflective knowledge and yet simultaneously 
acknowledging our desire for validity of some kind in our historical writings. 
Unfortunately this debate is often framed in terms of subjectivity-objectivity, but this, 
according to Ricoeur, does not distinguish between the self of pathos and the self of 
research, nor does it critique subjectivity as extensively as objectivity. This further 
distinction allows for exploration of the many ways in which interpretation runs 
through historiography and in particular the „subtle connection between personal 
motivation and public reasoning‟ (MHF, 339). Exploring interpretation thus becomes 
another means of exploring the nature of truth in history. 
 
The second chapter in this part takes up in detail a theme that bobs to the surface 
throughout the book, time. Ricoeur argues that consideration of temporality marks the 
passage from critical hermeneutics to ontological hermeneutics, in which the 
historical condition is seen as an „unsurpassable mode of being‟ (MHF, 343); 
acknowledging the temporality of being is therefore an existential precondition for 
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understanding the nature of history. This is pursued through consideration of 
Augustine‟s suggestion that the present dominates and Heidegger‟s counter that the 
future and death are more significant. The chapter is structured around analysis of 
(and confrontation with) Heidegger‟s notion of Da-sein, its three modalities of 
temporalization and the introduced notion of care as an alternative ultimate referent. 
At this point Ricoeur introduces his final pivotal argument, that history is in part a 
means of representing the dead, a kind of sepulcher transformed by historiography 
into writing, a means of making clear that the dead were once alive, that the „dead of 
today are yesterday‟s living‟ (MHF, 380), a kind of resurrection, reenactment, 
recollection. All because we have a debt to the past and the dead to remember and to 
repeat, but all the while remembering „the „thickness‟ of the interpretive processes 
interpolated between the present representation and the „having-been‟ of the repeated 
past‟ (MHF, 382). 
 
This takes us to the final twist in what seems at times a very long road from memory, 
through history, to forgetting. According to the final chapter forgetting and 
forgiveness designate the horizon of the entire book; each is distinct yet they come 
together at a non-place where memory is appeased and we can forget happily. 
Forgetting is however also emblematic of the vulnerability of memory and history, as 
its possibility challenges the essences of both. As well as that, forgetting is argued to 
be psychologically and ideologically possible, and here Ricoeur maps out the „hard‟ 
version of the linguistic turn in the social sciences to demonstrate what a dead end he 
considers it. While we must of course recognize the power relations embedded in 
writing, Ricoeur once again suggests that narrative analysis on its own is a trap in 
attempts to understand the historiographical operation. He turns to the original social 
actors who are continuously in danger of being stripped of their voices and yet can be 
complicit in this, as they don‟t always want to know/remember themselves; hence the 
challenge, „… dare to give an account of yourself!‟ (MHF, 449). This is finally 
explored with reference to the experiences of the French in relation to the Second 
World War and the „structuring of forgetfulness‟ practiced in that society for a 
generation.  
 
In this conclusion we find an echo of another treatise on the nature of history which 
Ricoeur takes as his starting point for the final section. Nietzsche (1980[1874]) 
(in)famously argued that historical accounts are only of use or value if they move 
beyond „objective‟ uncovering of facts, monumental or antiquarian history. He 
critiques history that claims to be objective for its focus on the high points of the past 
and an implicit belief in continuity and generalization; both past and present are 
distorted by the neglect of all except „great men‟ and their actions. However, the other 
side of this means of conducting the historiographical operation, antiquarian history, 
is characterised by a glorification of the past in an attempt to preserve and reproduce 
it. Antiquarian historians are thus possessed by detail and apt to romanticise or 
venerate the past. Equally, a third approach, „critical history‟, is flawed in its 
assumption that all previous actions must be judged as inadequate or weak, leading to 
despair and nihilism. Ricoeur‟s encouragement to work towards the conduct of history 
through critical agency chimes with Nietzsche‟s solution to this impasse but also 
extends well beyond it in the encouragement to act, through historical accounts and 
analysis, as a service that enables life and action in the „never to be completed 
imperfect tense‟ (Nietzsche 1980, 9). This requires a judicious balance between living 
ahistorically in the moment of action and historical reflection which is used to inform 
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action. In short, history should be undertaken for the sake of life and must always be 
understood in the context of contemporary action. 
 
This structures the final pages of MHF, where the historiographical operation is 
finally brought back to considerations of public or social obligation, as the boundary 
between forgetting and forgiving is crossed in consideration of pardon and amnesty, 
institutionalized forms of forgetting. The obvious difficulties in these processes are 
the potential to erase the past, inhibit learning, condemn competing memories and 
discourage dissensus. We might be deprived of the „salutary identity crisis that 
permits a lucid reappropriation of the past and its traumatic charge‟ (MHF, 456). 
Despite this, Ricoeur wishes to retain the possibility that forgetting can achieve 
integrity through the work of memory, mourning and forgiveness, making the process 
less a commandment to forget and more a wish in the optative mood. The epilogue 
then provides an eschatology of the „fault held to paralyze the power to act of the 
“capable being” that we are; and… the possible lifting of this existential incapacity, 
designated by the term “forgiveness”‟ (MHF, 457). The depth of fault or height of 
forgiveness, dynamics between forgiveness and institutions (political, judicial, social), 
punishment, and blame are all examined. A dialectic of repentance is proposed 
wherein the issue is „the power of the spirit of forgiveness to unbind the agent from 
his act‟ (MHF, 459). This is not simply to uncouple a person from an act but rather to 
uncouple the power at the heart of agency: effectuation and the capacity that it 
actualizes. This links the notion of forgiveness and its practice to the preceding 500 or 
so pages of the book, leading the reader towards the conclusion that happiness is the 
key to understanding the phenomenology of memory and that happy, peaceful, 
reconciled memory are what we wish for. Within this, however, we must recognise 
that history can never achieve this aim – the „small miracle of recognition‟ is blocked 
by the system of writing that underpins the historiographical operation. This is 
reinforced by historiography‟s use of explanation and understanding and in particular 
the notion of „because‟.  
 
Towards a critical hermeneutic of business history (and Business History) 
 
As noted at the outset of this piece, the arguments presented in Memory, History, 
Forgetting are woven into a philosophical fabric from which they cannot be 
separated. Nonetheless, it is our contention that the issues it raises are central to the 
conduct of business history. Our aim is not to criticize business history, business 
historians, or the journal used as the source of statements about the historiographical 
operation. Instead we suggest that the conduct of business history, from engaging with 
materials generated through memory to publication of argumentative narratives, could 
be improved significantly through a higher degree of epistemological engagement. 
Our secondary aim is to assert that such an engagement would assist in making the 
boundaries of the discipline more permeable, allowing greater interchange with and 
recognition from „mainstream‟ scholars of business, management and organization, 
thereby encouraging a more diverse group of people to engage with business history. 
 
These aims are pursued first through our reading of two key editorials from Business 
History (Harvey and Jones 1990; Harvey and Wilson 2007). In the first of these, the 
editors note the advances in business history stimulated by Alfred Chandler‟s work, 
with moves towards independent scholarship and theory development especially 
important. Other key issues raised in this editorial include: writing (the need to 
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produce shorter pieces as well as multi-volume single company histories), methods 
(the need for methodological openness as well as archival research), calendrical time 
(the need to consider history as a connection between past and present, rather than 
treating all events post-1939 as beyond the pale), defining the field empirically, 
possibilities for the future, and „a more fluid integration of the empirical with the 
theoretical‟ (Harvey and Jones 1990, 16). At this point the practice of business history 
in the UK was thought to be in the stage of „vigorous youth‟.  
 
The second editorial (Harvey and Wilson 2007) reflects more on the institutional 
conditions of business history, noting the creation of new associations and „specialist‟ 
journals. Yet two key problems remain: the lack of business history teaching and the 
lack of influence on other areas of management and organization studies. The editors 
attribute business history‟s ongoing marginality to business schools, in particular the 
pressure to produce „instrumental knowledge‟. However, they also note the continuing 
perception of business historians as „fact-mongers without theory‟ (Harvey and 
Wilson 2007, 3). Potential solutions include hitching the historical wagon to 
contemporary issues such as corporate governance or emphasizing the integrative 
aspects of historical understanding. More engagement with the social sciences is 
planned, through inviting scholars from „outside‟ business history to consider how 
their work „links‟ to the field and themed journal issues on topical subjects. 
Scholarship, however, will continue to be judged first (and foremost) on the basis of 
the „use of primary materials and the depth and originality of the analysis‟ (Harvey 
and Wilson 2007, 6). 
 
In addition to these two agenda-setting pieces we also consider four review papers 
published in Business History in the period between the two editorials (McKinlay 
1992; Wale 2001; Blackford 2003; Rollings 2007). These papers are read primarily 
for their empirical content, as they provide an informed account of business history 
from within the journal and beyond. The review papers also provide an insight into 
the engagement of the field with theoretical developments in the social sciences. Our 
reading of these papers is structured around our interpretation of the Ricoeur‟s 
arguments. The topic throughout is the historiographical operation – not simply the 
use of archival material, not just assessing the content of archives, and not just the 
narrative act through which history is produced. This entire, often lengthy, process 
involves a series of epistemological shifts, each of which affects the status of the 
claim being made, the reader‟s understanding of history, and the identity of the 
historian. The ultimate aim, as we see it, is for history and historians to assume 
private, professional, and public reflexivity in what they are doing.  
 
Interpretation of Ricoeur‟s arguments thus involves a significant re-orientation of 
business history. First, the status of data comes into question; not in the sense that 
data loses status and becomes merely a series of words that lose intrinsic meaning or 
value – quite the opposite, and this is the main contribution that taking MHF seriously 
would bring. Systematically interrogating the data that business history is based on, 
for example through asking how the data came to be, what/who is present and absent 
from it and whose data they are, would result in gains in confidence as to the 
foundations on which historical analyses are built. Understanding data as already 
infused with epistemological and ontological values would lead to greater insight as to 
both their nature and the means of interpretation. Our experience is that published 
business history does not routinely explore these issues or encourage reflection on its 
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implications, beyond noting that some data should be treated with caution because of 
possible bias. The recognition that all memories are subjectively complex and open to 
question through recognition of the phenomenology of self, even before memory is 
transformed into document or testimony, would be an entirely different proposition.  
 
Second, exploration of the nature of testimony that conducting business history 
involves calls that aspect of the historiographical operation into question, but again, in 
a wholly positive way. As historians transform memory into testimony through 
defining what is legitimate as archival material and then providing such material with 
a narrative structure or plot, it is surely right to expect acknowledgement of the 
shifting ground on which the operation stands. Decisions made as to what data to 
include or exclude, and further decisions relating to the story woven around archival 
materials, involve the historian in a relationship of trust with those (both dead and 
living), who generate the data and read the history produced from it. Beyond 
exhortations to be „true to the archives‟ we are not aware that business history takes 
these relationships, and the nature of the trust implied, seriously enough to write it 
into accounts. 
 
Third and last, being aware of the nature of the historical condition, and how its 
hermeneutic can inform the conduct of business history, leads us to consideration of 
the public duty of the historian. Is there, as Ricoeur implies, an obligation on 
historians to encourage both remembering and forgetting? We suggest that in business 
history there is a tendency towards „over-remembering‟ of certain aspects of practice 
(for example, the actions of individual early industrialists, or more recently the 
decision making processes of senior executives in large organizations), and a 
forgetting of darker aspects of organizational and managerial pasts (for example, 
slavery or organizational engagement with totalitarian regimes). The critical agency 
of historians in making decisions as to what form of historical condition we inhabit is, 
we think, the most challenging of Ricoeur‟s three areas of inquiry and also the respect 
where there has been least systematic activity in business history.  
 
From this we suggest that we are able to think of the norms of business history (and 
Business History) in contrast to theoretically sensitive historiography, perhaps 
informed by Ricoeur‟s arguments, perhaps informed by competing theorizations of 
the historiographical operation (e.g. White 1987; McCloskey 2006). In his review 
McKinlay (1992) notes that business history is beginning to emerge from the 19
th
 
century and studies of individual companies; nonetheless he also makes clear that the 
majority of work published continues to focus on that time period or earlier and takes 
specific named organizations or industries as empirical sites. McKinlay further 
suggests business historians are starting to treat the data they draw on as a product of 
memory rather than an objective referent, but he goes on to give an account of 
business history in 1990 that is overwhelmingly dominated by evidence-based or 
empiricist, unicausal accounts of uncontrovertible „events‟. Theoretical development 
is mentioned, principally through moving beyond Chandler‟s dichotomies, but it is 
limited to the importation of analytical frameworks from economics which, as 
McKinlay notes, is the discipline that business history has traditionally drawn on. 
However, McKinlay‟s review suggests accounting history, an area that has since 
become established as reflexive and critical in a way business history has not, already 
shows signs of the reflexivity in historiographical operations that Ricoeur calls for.  
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From McKinlay‟s combative and highly individual perspective on business history we 
move to a more measured and conventional representation. Wale (2001) begins by 
noting that she could structure her review according to either sector (e.g. mining, 
agriculture) or topic (e.g. corporate governance), implying this is an indication of 
increasing diversity. Wale also notes positively that some business history brings the 
reader to the present day, a significant advance in the conceptualization of the 
historical condition. Despite these two shifts, however, Wale‟s account suggests that 
business history still remains highly empiricist, unicausal, and objectivist – the size of 
coal wagons is the subject of more scholarly debate than the epistemology of the 
historical sciences. „Disproving‟ and „revising‟ arguments are key to making a 
contribution to the field, rather than reflexive writing that engages with forgetting as 
well as remembering; anatomization of cost accounts is thought to provide more 
insight than exploration of why the accounts are archived as they are. Reference is 
made to a paper published in the field of accounting history that exhorts researchers 
there to take account of alternative methodologies and theoretical perspectives from 
the wider social sciences (Parker, 1997), but Wale dismisses this as „lacking in 
novelty or originality to most business historians‟ (Wale 2001, 9). Finally Wale notes 
that the decade has been one in which it has become clear that business historians will 
need to adopt „different methodologies from hitherto‟ (Wale 2001, 14). However, she 
gives little sense of what such methodologies might look like. 
 
Following on from this, Blackford (2003) begins by noting with approval the 
extension of business history into more and varied sectors, as well as highlighting the 
continuing influence of Chandler‟s arguments. The tone of this review is if anything 
more evidence-based, periodized and inferential than Wale‟s contribution. Studies are 
said to „show‟ highly specific facts, generalization is viewed somewhat suspiciously 
and empiricist „findings‟ are paramount. Once again, cost accounting forms a 
significant part of British business memory and it is implied that testimony emerges 
naturalistically from the contents of archives. One paper reviewed that is indicative of 
this approach concludes that Chandler‟s ideas cannot be applied to British 
confectionery firms. Similarly, an account of two papers that debate the contents of a 
list of the largest British firms in 1907 is typical of the level of epistemological 
engagement with data. Finally, it appears from this review that the ideal of achieving 
„complete‟ accounts of industries, firms or individuals continues to carry more 
credibility with historians than anything else.  
 
The final paper in this tetralogy appeared in the same year as the second editorial 
discussed above. Rollings (2007) begins promisingly, from our perspective, by 
implying that what is (not) business history is increasingly dependent on the reader as 
well as the author, an idea that suggests a more poststructural approach. However, the 
review then proceeds in a much more conventional fashion, categorizing papers 
according to industry, economics, finance and banking; historians are, according to 
this review, still „showing‟ facts and working towards a complete understanding of, 
for example, why individual land holdings are scattered around medieval villages 
rather than conjoined. The final section of this review is rather different from those 
previously discussed; Rollings claims business history can now be seen as a discipline 
that is informed by and influences a wide range of other areas of other aspects of 
social science. He suggests it is now „rare to discover a business history article which 
simply provides a narrative account of the development of a particular company or 
aspect of its operations‟ (Rollings 2007, 284). Yet it seems from this account of recent 
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activity within business history that the field remains dominated by what we believe 
Ricoeur would define as conventional and that the reflexive is in very short supply. 
 
Concluding comments 
 
This paper has been written in a deliberately provocative tone. However, our 
observations are informed by our own engagement with business history and our 
desire to engage with this intellectual community. We thus do not see ourselves as 
somehow „outside‟ the field, whilst at the same time we cannot claim to be complete 
cultural or institutional insiders. Our principal aim has been to persuade theoretical 
non-believers of the need to engage and reflect theoretically on the historiographical 
operation. Ricoeur‟s exploration of memory, history and forgetting provides us with 
the stimulus to think about business history from a perspective that differs from the 
annual reviews discussed above. Our secondary aim has been to encourage ourselves 
and others doing business history to produce more reflexive and theoretically 
sensitive accounts. This is driven by our belief that responsibility for the lack of 
recognition of business history from scholars in „mainstream‟ scholars of business, 
management and organization, as identified by those working centrally within the 
field, lies partly with historians themselves.  
 
The ideas proposed here might also be seen as complementary to the development of 
a new kind of interdisciplinary management and organizational history which seeks to 
achieve greater reflexivity in relation to research methods and styles of writing (Clark 
and Rowlinson, 2004). Doing history in a way that brings it to a wider academic and 
lay audience implies a critical hermeneutic (Ricoeur 1978; Thompson 1981; Phillips 
and Brown 1993) that focuses in part on the sources of text, why they are produced 
and who by, recognizing that texts are intentionally produced and intended to be 
received by others and that they are instrumental in „maintaining or changing the 
cultural fabric of an organization or societal group‟ (Phillips and Brown 1993, 1548). 
Historical narrative must be understood as a compositional process involving events 
and characters, including the author, with the aim of constructing a unified and 
meaningful account. This contrasts with a more conventional approach dominated by 
explanation of how and why events occurred with little concern for how they shape 
meaning. The narrative then is more than a means of explanation or communication; it 
is a discursive strategy that indicates a pragmatic aim. More reflexive engagement 
with the foundations and products of the historiographical operation would help to 
make the conduct of history less tacit and therefore more comprehensible to non-
historians, and thus more difficult to marginalize or dismiss.  
 
 
